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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of an informative letter versus a Facebook ad, 
and the effectiveness of arousing curiosity versus arousing fear to raise pension 
awareness. Pension awareness is measured by 1) basic knowledge of the pension 
system, and 2) actions undertaken to get an overview of one’s accrued pension enti-
tlements. To identify the causal effect of a letter, we rely on a randomized field exper-
iment using a representative sample of about 4,000 individuals in the Netherlands. 
Randomization is involved in 1) receiving an informative letter, and 2) the framing of 
the letter (arousing curiosity or fear). To identify causal effects of a Facebook ad with 
the same content, we use an Instrumental Variables approach with Facebook usage as 
an instrument. This quasi-experimental approach avoids ethical issues with experi-
ments on social media platforms. We find that the Facebook ad is very cost-effective 
in increasing basic knowledge and the number of logins on the pension overview 
website. An informative letter is less cost-effective than a Facebook ad, but in itself 
a letter with fear appeal is almost twice as effective as a Facebook ad in raising the 
knowledge of the pension system, even six weeks after receiving the letter. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Nederland is bezig met belangrijke hervormingen in de tweede pijler. De maatsch-
appelijke houdbaarheid van een nieuw pensioencontract staat of valt met de 
communicatie ervan. Een algemene trend is dat mensen meer keuzes krijgen en dat 
het aantal zelfstandigen toeneemt. Deze ontwikkelingen vergroten het belang van 
pensioenbewustzijn. Om goed te kunnen communiceren over pensioenmaterie is het 
belangrijk om meer inzicht te krijgen in de mate waarin de Nederlandse bevolking 
pensioenbewust is en hoe pensioenbewustzijn meest effectief verhoogd kan worden. 
 In dit paper onderscheiden we twee vormen van pensioenbewustzijn: a) het juist 
kunnen beantwoorden van basisvragen over het pensioenstelsel; b) het inloggen 
bij mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl om meer te weten te komen over de eigen situatie. 
We onderzoeken of jongeren en ouderen op een andere manier benaderd zouden 
moeten worden. Voor zover wij weten is de effectiviteit van sociale media in pensio-
encommunicatie niet eerder onderzocht.
 We hebben een gerandomiseerd experiment uitgevoerd om het effect van brieven 
en de ‘framing’ ervan op pensioenbewustzijn te testen. De helft van de brieven roept 
nieuwsgierigheid op (‘curiosity appeal’), terwijl de andere helft appelleert aan angst 
(‘fear appeal’). Naast de brieven hebben we samen met Pensioenlab een bericht op 
Facebook geplaatst, gericht op mensen tussen de 20 en 40 jaar. We benutten infor-
matie over Facebook-gebruik om het causale effect van een bericht via sociale media 
op pensioenbewustzijn te meten. 
 De resultaten laten zien dat de pensioengeletterdheid in het algemeen laag is. Met 
onze onderbuik wisten we dat al, maar door het met cijfers te onderbouwen krijgen 
we er meer gevoel voor. Zo denkt bijvoorbeeld ruim 60% dat de AOW-premies (deels) 
belegd worden en bijna een derde dat alleen gepensioneerden te maken krijgen 
met pensioenkortingen. Informatieve brieven die appelleren aan angst verhogen de 
basiskennis over het pensioenstelsel, zelfs zes weken na ontvangst van de informatie. 
Dit effect is niet significant verschillend voor mensen tussen 20-40 en 40-64 jaar. 
Jongeren en ouderen kunnen dus met dezelfde framing benaderd worden. De brieven 
die aan angst appelleren hadden significant meer impact dan de brieven die een 
appel doen aan nieuwsgierigheid. Het voorgevoel dat mensen een brief die aan angst 
appelleert mogelijk minder zouden lezen omdat ze negatieve informatie vermijden, 
blijkt in dit experiment ongegrond. Een nadeel van het appelleren aan angst kan 
zijn dat we mensen onnodig bang maken. Echter, we zien dat mensen die zo’n brief 
ontvangen hadden niet meer bezorgd waren over hun pensioen dan mensen zonder 
zulke brief. Hoewel een brief ongeveer twee keer zo effectief is in het verhogen van 
netspar design paper 147 6
pensioengeletterdheid dan een Facebook-bericht, is dit laatste vanwege de relatief 
lage kosten wel meer kosteneffectief. Daarnaast is een Facebook-bericht effectiever in 
het verhogen van het gebruik van mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl. 
 Wanneer de overheid, pensioenfondsen, verzekeraars en sociale partners mensen 
willen informeren over pensioen mogen ze er rekening mee houden dat informatie 
uit een brief die aan angst appelleert beter beklijft dan informatie uit een brief 
die nieuwsgierigheid tracht op te roepen. De kosteneffectiviteit van een bericht via 
sociale media is hoog en zo’n bericht is meer geschikt dan een brief om mensen door 
te verwijzen naar een website. 
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1. Introduction
The aging of the population that many Western countries are experiencing has 
resulted in a wide range of pension reforms aimed at sustaining the public finances 
of these countries. Furthermore, occupational pension systems in many countries 
are shifting from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans (Atkinson et al. 
2012). Whereas pension plans were traditionally an employer’s paternal responsibility, 
they have increasingly become an individual responsibility. Pension reforms and the 
increased personal responsibility raise concerns about how pension information can 
best be communicated, so as to ensure that individuals understand their options and 
can be guided towards sensible and adequate retirement savings decisions. Pension 
communication is the concern of governments as well as private pension funds and 
insurance companies, and it is of particular interest because pension reforms are 
high on the policy agenda of many countries. Furthermore, it has potentially major 
implications for retirement savings (McKenzie and Liersch, 2011).
 A vast amount of recent literature has shown that numerous people are ill-in-
formed about pension matters and lack the basic knowledge to make well-informed 
financial decisions (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).1 This applies to a wide range of coun-
tries that have different pension systems.2 Financial illiteracy is particularly severe 
among women and among low-educated, low-income, unemployed, and young 
individuals (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). Financially illiterate households are generally 
found to make worse financial decisions than their financially literate counterparts, 
which has consequences for the adequacy of income during retirement (Van Rooij et 
al. 2012). 
 Although acquiring financial knowledge can be costly at the individual level 
(Delavande et al. 2008; Lusardi et al. 2017), it may be socially optimal to increase 
financial literacy. Especially as ill-informed individuals are less responsive to incen-
tives in the pension system because of misperceptions (Chan and Stevens, 2008; 
Mastrobuoni, 2011; Van Rooij and Teppa, 2014; Liebman and Luttmer, 2015). Also, for 
sound political decisions it is crucial that voters understand the basic concepts of 
the pension system (Fornero, 2015). Furthermore, understanding the basic concepts 
1 Studies in various academic disciplines confirm this (Lynch, 2011).
2 E.g. Agnew et al., 2013; Alessie et al., 2011; Almenberg and Säve-Södenberg, 2011; Van Rooij et 
al., 2011; Arrondel et al., 2013; Beckmann, 2013; Boisclair et al., 2015; Fornero and Monticone, 
2011; Klapper and Panos, 2011; Crossan et al., 2011; Bücher-Koenen et al., 2011; Sekita, 2011; 
Brown and Graf, 2013; Landerretche and Martinez, 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011.
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may increase the confidence that people have in the pension system.3 This paper 
aims to increase our knowledge on how information can best be made available, by 
investigating the effectiveness of specific framing (fear versus curiosity appeal) and by 
analyzing two different communication channels (letters and social media) on raising 
pension awareness. 
 Framing is an important concept in behavioral economics. Behavioral insights play 
an important role in stimulating (or discouraging) economic behavior (Hossain and 
List, 2012; Thaler et al., 2012; Ferraro and Price, 2013). Such insights can help overcome 
myopia in long-term decisions such as in savings behavior (Thaler and Benartzi, 
2004). Karlan et al. (2016), for example, showed how certain reminder messages by 
banks lead to higher savings in committed savings accounts. 
 Research shows that framing affects perceived risk and risk-taking behavior 
(Lehner, 2000; Steul, 2006; Diacon and Hasseldine, 2007). In addition, Eberhardt et 
al. (2017), building upon the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), found 
that an assurance frame (the loss alternative) can be twice as effective compared to 
an investment frame (the gain alternative) in engaging participants to click on a video 
link that explains changes in their pension scheme. Likewise, Van Putten et al. (2018) 
found that loss frames lead more people to change their pension profiles online than 
gain frames or neutral frames. Framing also affects social security benefit claiming 
decisions (Brown et al., 2016). 
 In this study we compare fear appeal and curiosity appeal. A recent meta-study 
found that framing that appeals to fear can be highly effective in influencing behavior 
(Tannenbaum, 2015). Although such fear appeal is generally effective in inducing 
pension saving (Block and Keller, 1995; Agnew et al., 2008; Montgomery et al., 2011; 
Bateman et al., 2015; Bockweg et al. 2017), it may also scare participants off (Eberhardt 
et al., 2017). Furthermore, the effectiveness of the specific type of framing may well 
differ between groups of people, such as the young and the old. Charles et al. (2003) 
found that older people are more likely to remember information that is positively 
framed than negatively framed information, while such an effect is not found among 
the young. The effect of positive framing is particularly strong when it concerns 
health-related information (Shamaskin et al., 2010) and invitations to exercise 
(Nolthoff and Carstensen, 2014).
3 For example, in The Netherlands many young people are concerned that no pension will be left 
for them by the time they reach retirement. With a better understanding of the pension sys-
tem, they would know that, with low interest rates, a relatively large amount of pension assets 
are reserved for younger people.
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 In addition to these behavioral measures, Bauer et al. (2017) suggest that monetary 
strategies remain important. They find that people are more likely to inform them-
selves about their individual pension situation with a small financial incentive than 
with nudging. Carpena (2017), on the other hand, found that financial incentives do 
not increase the results of financial education.
 Research shows that households collect pension information through different 
channels (Johansen, 2013). This paper compares an old communication channel (a 
letter) with a new channel (social media). In Western countries, where access to the 
internet is nearly universal, the vast majority of young adults use social media.4 Aside 
from companies being able to communicate directly with their customers, social 
media enable consumer-to-consumer communication (Mangold and Faulds, 2009). 
This type of communication is found to affect purchasing decisions (Wang et al., 2012). 
Research also suggests that Facebook, which has dominated the social media market 
for over a decade, can be an effective instrument for finding a job (Gee et al., 2017). 
Social media are not only reserved for commercial products; nonprofit organizations 
also increasingly use social media to expand public awareness (Waters et al., 2009). 
This takes the form of government bodies communicating with citizens regarding 
numerous topics pertaining to public safety (Kavanaugh et al., 2012). The public strat-
egy of informing citizens through social media is also promising in health communi-
cation (Househ et al., 2014). The use of social media appears to be an emerging trend 
for patients who are looking for health information, and Chou et al. (2009) show that 
also more disadvantaged groups can be reached this way. However, these studies are 
mainly exploratory, and issues concerning the causality of findings are postponed. In 
this paper we aim to deal with causality and to test whether social media provide an 
opportunity to increase pension awareness. 
 This paper analyzes both the effectiveness of different pension communication 
channels and of framing in raising pension awareness. Here, pension awareness 
is defined in terms of two components: 1) pension literacy and 2) logging in on a 
national website5 to obtain an overview of one’s accrued pension rights (referred to 
as the “pension check” in the rest of this paper). The first component measures the 
general knowledge of people (with five basic questions about the pension system), 
while the second component measures whether people inform themselves about their 
personal pension situation. 
4 https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media.
5 In the Netherlands a national website, mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl, launched by the Dutch pen-
sion sector, provides individuals a combined overview of their public and occupational pen-
sions (possibly from several pension funds). 
netspar design paper 147 10
 First, we analyze the effectiveness of sending an informative letter. The letter con-
sists of information regarding the pension system and provides a link to the pension 
check (in Dutch: mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl). To identify the causal effect of the letter 
on pension awareness, we rely on a randomized field experiment with a represen-
tative sample of about 4,000 individuals in the Netherlands (thus avoiding problems 
related to correlational studies of financial literacy, as explained by Fernandes et al., 
2014). Second, since randomization takes place both in sending a letter and in the 
framing of the letter (curiosity or fear appeal), we are able to analyze the effectiveness 
of curiosity versus fear appeal on pension literacy and doing the pension check. Third, 
we analyze the extent to which Facebook is an effective communication channel to 
increase pension awareness. To do this, we approached 770,134 individuals between 
the ages of 20 and 40 with a Facebook ad. We focus on the effectiveness of using 
Facebook as a communication channel for spreading important information and 
convincing people to visit a website. As no randomization takes place in viewing the 
ad, we use an instrumental variable approach with Facebook usage as an instrument.
 The contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold. First, whereas other 
researchers investigated the effect of framing on outcome measures such as risk 
perception, annuity choices, social security claiming, retirement saving intentions, or 
clicking on a video about pensions, this paper investigates the effect of framing on 
pension awareness. As far as we know, this is the first paper on pension communica-
tion that investigates whether people have a better knowledge of the pension system 
six (!) weeks after receiving a letter.6 
 Second, we are the first to investigate whether social media can play an effective 
role in raising pension awareness. Specifically, we apply a quasi-experimental 
approach to identify causal effects of interventions through social media. Earlier 
papers, such as Kramer et al. (2014a), used experiments through Facebook, which has 
led to discussions regarding the ethics of such experiments (Kramer et al., 2014b). We 
propose an instrumental variable approach with social media usage as an instrument. 
In this way, we can avoid ethical concerns.7 This paper shows that being a Facebook 
user is a strong instrumental variable in a quasi-experimental IV-framework. This 
variable can easily be used also in other studies on different topics. 
6 Liebman (2015) examines knowledge on key Social Security features even one year after sending 
a brochure.
7 Ethics of data usage in the social media era are under a magnifying glass since the incident 
with Cambridge Analytica, where the data of 87 million users may have been used to target 
voters on behalf of the Trump presidential candidacy and the Brexit referendum. 
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 Third, our respondents are representative of the overall Dutch population, instead 
of being specifically targeted (like the often-used setting of company-specific 
employees or pension fund- specific participants). With our representative dataset we 
even have a sufficiently large number of observations to investigate heterogeneous 
effects between large subgroups with respect to age, gender, and education level; this 
may be important as Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) argue that there is substantial het-
erogeneity in both financial literacy and financial behavior. Finally, the Netherlands 
is an interesting case as most of the retirement savings are mandatory (Knoef et al., 
2016), which implies less incentive to invest in financial literacy (Jappelli and Padula, 
2013). Our conclusions yield new insights in communication strategies for govern-
mental policy setting and for pension funds and insurance companies for important 
lifecycle decisions.
 The main findings indicate that a Facebook ad is a very cost-effective method to 
activate respondents to log in on a website to view their personal pension overview. 
Letters that attempt to arouse curiosity do not have any significant effect on pension 
literacy six weeks later, but fear appeal increases pension literacy significantly. The 
Facebook ad, however, is much cheaper than a letter and more cost-effective in this 
regard. We do not find significant heterogeneous effects with regard to age, gender, 
and education level. These results are robust to a variety of specifications.
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the randomized field 
experiment regarding the informative letters as well as the quasi-experiment using 
the Facebook ad. Data and descriptive statistics are described in Section 3. Estimation 
results are presented in Section 4. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 5 and 
provide some additional discussion of the results in Section 6. 
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2. Method
This section first describes the design of the field experiment to analyze the effective-
ness of an informative letter and of framing to increase pension awareness. Section 
2.2 explains the quasi-experimental design used to investigate the effectiveness of a 
Facebook ad to increase pension awareness. 
2.1 Letter
To test whether an informative letter increases pension awareness we set up a field 
experiment. In this experiment we designed a letter consisting of three parts. The first 
part is the introduction, which is framed to arouse either curiosity or fear. The letter 
that is meant to arouse curiosity asks the readers whether they aren’t curious about 
their pension. The letter with fear appeal asks them if they want to know whether 
they have saved enough, given the gloomy media reports about pensions.8 The sec-
ond part of the letter asks the reader to do the pension check (i.e. logging in on the 
personal pension registry to see one’s personal pension entitlements). To reduce the 
hassle involved with logging into the personal pension overview, the information was 
sent at the time of the yearly tax return, where the same password is needed to file 
taxes. The third part shows seven basic facts about the pension system. 
We use a panel of representative individuals and randomly assign them to one of the 
following three groups:
Figure 1. The field experiment
   
Positively framed letter (25%)
 
Letter
  Negatively framed letter (25%)
 No letter (50%)
The letter was sent on March 17, 2017. As from May 1 the panel received an online ques-
tionnaire which they could fill out until May 19.9 To measure pension literacy, we rely 
on the financial literacy literature and test basic pension knowledge by means of five 
8 Appendix A shows the two letters. 
9 The letter was sent in name of Pensioenlab, a Dutch organization that aims to increase pension 
awareness. Six weeks later the questionnaire was sent in name of Leiden University to an 
online panel that regularly answers questionnaires on a wide variety of topics. We asked a 
general question about the pension check and did not refer to Pensioenlab anywhere in the 
survey. Therefore, we expect that it was unlikely that panel members would have realized that 
the letter and the questionnaire related to each other.
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general questions, all based on the information presented in the letters (for details, 
see Section 3). Second, we asked people about the pension check. 
 To analyze the effects of a letter on pension awareness, we compare individuals 
who received a letter (the treatment group) to individuals who did not receive a 
letter (the control group). We thus estimate the intention to treat (instead of a lab 
experiment, where respondents are forced to read a letter). We estimate the following 
equation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
  ,   (1)
where yi is pension literacy for individual i, α1 and β1 are regression coefficients, Di 
is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i received a letter, and εi is the 
error term. As a robustness check we also estimate (1) using control variables such as 
gender, education, household composition, age, and work situation. However, since 
the letters were randomly sent this should not change the results.
To differentiate between letters that arouse curiosity and those that arouse fear, we 
estimate 
  ,  (2)
where D+ is a dummy variable, which is equal to one for individuals who received a 
curiosity-framed letter and zero for all other individuals. β2 measures the effect of 
the letter with fear appeal. The sum of β2 and δ1 measures the effect of a curiosity- 
framed letter.  
 To analyze the probability of doing the pension check, we estimate a model 
with the same variables as specified above. However, to take into account the 
binary nature of the outcome variable, we estimate a probit model using Maximum 
Likelihood, instead of OLS. Whether people did the pension check is a self-reported 
variable.10 Social desirability may lead to overestimation of the number of people 
doing the pension check. However, we do not expect this to bias our results, because 
we do not expect the treatment to affect the self-report bias. That is because the 
letter was sent in name of Pensioenlab (a Dutch independent organization that aims 
to increase pension awareness). Six weeks later the questionnaire was sent in name 
of Leiden University to an online panel that answers questionnaires on a regular 
basis. We asked a general question about the pension check and did not refer to 
10 We ask the following question: “Did you (or your partner, if applicable) log in on mijnpensio-
enoverzicht.nl in the past six weeks?”. This is the fourth question in the survey and is asked 
prior to the questions related to pension literacy.
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Pensioenlab anywhere in the survey. Therefore, the treated individuals did not know 
that the letter and the questionnaire related to each other. 
2.2 Facebook ad
To test whether social media is an effective channel to increase pension awareness, 
we published a Facebook ad on April 4, 2017 that informed people about the pension 
system and asked them to do the pension check (see appendix B). The ad did not 
contain the first framing part of the letter (and was thus framed in a neutral way). 
Furthermore, since Facebook is not made for large messages, we reduced the amount 
of information, as well as the number of pension literacy questions in the analysis, 
from five to three. The ad targeted people in the Netherlands between the ages of 
20 and 40 years. This does not mean that people over 40 were unable to see the 
ad since members of their network may ‘like’ the ad, but the chances of that were 
small. The ad appeared on people’s Facebook timeline, like a regular ad, regardless of 
whether they subscribed to specific groups and/or pages. Hence, seeing or not seeing 
the ad was independent of a person’s preferences and behavior.11 However, only the 
Facebook users had the opportunity to see the ad. In the online survey (using the 
same panel as in the field experiment with the letters explained above) we asked 
whether respondents had noticed the Facebook ad. 
 Since it is not possible to randomize a Facebook ad,12 just regressing our outcome 
variables on whether the Facebook ad was noticed by the respondent may yield 
results that suffer from endogeneity. For example, there could be third factors, such 
as interest in pensions, that influence both pension awareness and viewing the 
Facebook ad. It may be that only persons who are interested in pensions and are 
already relatively pension-aware noticed the Facebook ad (only a selective sample 
noticed the ad), or that especially those who did see the Facebook ad and became 
more aware of their pension and the pension system remembered that they had seen 
the ad (selective measurement error in the self-report of having seen the ad). This 
would lead OLS to overestimate the effect of the Facebook ad on pension awareness. 
On the other hand, it could be that especially those who were relatively unaware 
of pensions remembered the Facebook ad, while those who are already aware of 
pensions did not pay attention anymore and scrolled further without noticing the ad 
11 That is because, when publishing the ad, we only asked Facebook to select users between the 
ages of 20 and 40. We did not use any other targeting options.  
12 In 2014, Kramer et al. studied emotional contagion with a Facebook experiment in the US 
among 155,000 Facebook users. After the study was published, ethical concerns were expressed 
by the media, and PNAS published an “Editorial Expression of Concern” (Kramer et al., 2014b).
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consciously. They may have been confronted with the ad but without remembering 
it anymore. In that case OLS underestimates the effect of the Facebook ad on pension 
awareness. 
 To identify causal effects of the Facebook ad on pension awareness we use an 
Instrumental Variables approach. We asked respondents about the average time 
that they spend on Facebook per week and use this information to identify whether 
the respondent is a Facebook user or not.13 Respondents who use Facebook more 
than zero hours per week are defined as Facebook users; we use this information 
as an instrument. Being a Facebook user is likely to be correlated with noticing 
the Facebook ad (relevant instrument), but being a Facebook user is unlikely to 
be correlated with pension awareness other than through the Facebook ad (valid 
instrument). This approach has the advantage of avoiding ethical concerns regarding 
randomized experiments on Facebook (Kramer et al., 2014a; 2014b). To measure the 
true effect of complying with the treatment (that is remembering having seen the 
Facebook ad) on pension awareness14, we estimate 
    (3)
    (4)
where yi is pension literacy or doing the pension check for individual i (as specified 
before), FB indicates whether a person noticed the Facebook ad (one if the ad was 
noticed and zero otherwise), and Xi is a vector of control variables such as age, gen-
der, education level, and household composition. T is a dummy variable indicating 
whether individual i is a Facebook user, D is a dummy variable indicating whether 
individual i received a letter (as specified before), and D+ is a dummy variable 
indicating whether an individual received a curiosity-framed letter. υ and μ are 
unobserved zero-mean errors, and the correlation between υ and μ is presumably 
non-zero. When yi is pension literacy, we estimate a linear 2SLS model.15 We assume 
that the error terms are independent of (X, T, D, D+) and that T is correlated with FB, 
but not with the error term υ. When yi is the pension check, we estimate a linear 2SLS 
model (ignoring the binary nature of the outcome) and a bivariate probit model. In 
13 Specifically we asked: “How much time do you usually spend reading messages from your 
timeline on Facebook per week?”. This question is the third one asked in the survey, prior to 
the question about the pension check or the questions related to pension literacy.
14 This is comparable to research where people are asked to read a letter and afterwards to 
answer questions on the content. Other types of research may investigate how Facebook ads 
should be designed, such that they are remembered by people. 
15 Maximum Likelihood gave similar results.  
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the bivariate probit model, υ and μ are assumed to be independent of (X, T, D, D+) and 
to be drawn from a standard bivariate normal distribution with zero means, unit vari-
ances, and correlation coefficient ρ. This model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood. 
 A threat to identification may be that people who use Facebook do not take the 
time anymore to read a newspaper and may thus be less informed about the pension 
system. If this is the case, our method would underestimate the true effect of the 
Facebook ad on pension literacy. Another threat to identification may be that those 
who spend many hours on Facebook have more online skills and would therefore 
have logged in more often on the pension overview website. However, 97.5% of our 
target group of individuals between the ages of 20 and 40 are active internet users 
(Statistics Netherlands, 2018). We therefore expect all of them to be able to access the 
pension check website, independent of whether they are active Facebook users or 
not.16 
 Note that the effects of letters and of Facebook should be interpreted differently. 
For the letters we estimate the intention to treat. That is, the result is based on 
receiving a letter and not on the letter eventually being read. For the Facebook ad, 
on the other hand, we estimate the effect of the ad on pension awareness to be 
conditional on complying with the treatment (Figure 2). To be able to compare the 
effectiveness of the letters and of Facebook, Section 4.3 provides a back-of-the-enve-
lope cost-benefit analysis, where these differences are taken into account. 
16 As a robustness check, we do include information about the self-reported ability to find pen-
sion information (measured on a 5-point scale). Despite the fact that this variable is highly sig-
nificant, the conclusions do not change.
Figure 2. Intention to treat versus complying to the treatment
Sending a letter
Intention to treat
Publishing a 
Facebook ad
Reading the letter
Complying to the treatment
Reading the FB ad
Pension awareness
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3. Data
3.1 Sample
We collected data online using a panel of PanelWizard.17 The planned sample size 
after non-response was 4,000 individuals, of which 50% are between 20 and 40 
years old, and 50% between 41 and 64 years. The panel consisted of 4,560 individuals 
aged 20-40 and 3,387 individuals aged 41-64. These sizes were based upon expected 
non-response rates, which are higher for young than for old people. Within the two 
age groups we have a stratified sample that is representative of the Dutch population 
with regard to age, gender, household composition, labor market participation, and 
education. Details on the actual survey sample can be found in Table 1. This table 
shows that the sample consists of 4,297 respondents, of whom 4,164 completed the 
17 The survey pool of PanelWizard consists of respondents who actively enrolled in the panel. 
PanelWizard screens potential respondents on the basis of several tests that should indicate the 
seriousness of the potential respondent. If admitted to the panel, respondents receive a remu-
neration per survey question of 10 eurocents that they can use to sponsor a self-chosen charity. 
Although PanelWizard ensures that the survey pool is representative with respect to the Dutch 
population in terms of observed characteristics such as age, education, and labor market sta-
tus, the self-enrollment might induce self-selection in the panel if enrollees have different 
unobserved characteristics than non-enrollees. However, for our purpose of finding an effect 
between a control group and a treatment group, this is not too problematic as long as the con-
trol and treatment groups are on average the same in terms of unobserved characteristics. A 
priori there is no reason to believe that unobserved factors are correlated with the treatment. 
Table 1. Sample
Letter
  Curiosity Fear appeal None
Sample aged 20-40a
Gross sample 1,145 1,124 2,291
Non-response 583 573 1,229
Completed surveys 542 536 1,027
Incomplete surveys 20 15 35
Response rate 49% 49% 46%
Sample aged 41-64
Gross sample 883 727 1,777
Non-response 346 217 702
Completed surveys 528 493 1,038
Incomplete surveys 9 17 37
Response rate 61% 70% 60%
a To study the effect of the Facebook ad, we use the sample of people aged 20-40 only. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Letter
Curiosity Fear appeal None
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Female 0.47 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50
Low edu. level 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38
Median edu. level 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.50
High edu. level 0.35 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.47
Single household 0.28*** 0.45 0.23*** 0.42 0.18 0.38
Children 0.20*** 0.40 0.34 0.48 0.32 0.47
Full-time work 0.40 0.49 0.38* 0.49 0.41 0.49
Age 20-24 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
Age 25-29 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.33
Age 30-34 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.31
Age 35-40 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.37
Age 41-49 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41
Age 50-59 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.11 0.41
Age 60-64 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
Facebook ad 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11
Observations 1,092 1,051 2,154
Facebook ad Facebook user Total
No Yes No Yes  
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Female 0.49 0.50 0.42 0.50 0.32 0.47 0.51*** 0.50 0.45 0.50
Low edu. level 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.38
Median edu. level 0.48 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50
High edu. level 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48
Single household 0.22 0.41 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.41
Children 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.29** 0.46 0.29 0.46
Full-time work 0.40 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.30 0.46 0.41*** 0.49 0.40 0.49
Age 20-24 0.15 0.36 0.24* 0.43 0.08 0.27 0.16*** 0.37 0.08 0.27
Age 25-29 0.24 0.42 0.40** 0.50 0.21 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.12 0.33
Age 30-34 0.28 0.45 0.09*** 0.29 0.34 0.47 0.26** 0.44 0.14 0.35
Age 35-40 0.34 0.47 0.27 0.45 0.38 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.17 0.38
Age 41-49 - - - - - - - - 0.21 0.41
Age 50-59 - - - - - - - - 0.22 0.42
Age 60-64 - - - - - - - - 0.06 0.24
Facebook ad 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.12
Observations 2,121 45 273 1,902 4,297
* Denotes significant differences with “None/No” at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level. 
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whole survey.18 In the 20-40 age group, response rates are not significantly different 
across type of letter received (p=0.186). In the 40-64 age group  the response is 9 
percentage points higher for those who received the letter with fear appeal than for 
those who received no letter (p=0.000). 
 The composition of the sample across letter types and ‘no letter’ is, however, 
rather similar with regard to observed characteristics. Table 2 shows that only singles, 
people with children, and full-time workers show significant differences between the 
three groups (receiving a curiosity-framed letter, a fear-framed letter, or no letter). 
These differences, however, are not very large. For most of the other characteristics, 
the randomization process has not led to significant differences between groups. 
The Facebook ad reached 770,134 individuals in the Netherlands, without regard 
to preferences for pages or groups. We use a self-reported measure of seeing the 
Facebook ad in the survey.19 Forty-five of the individuals in our sample remembered 
seeing the Facebook ad. The percentage of respondents that noticed the Facebook ad 
is quite similar among the groups that received a curiosity-framed letter, the fear-
framed letter, or no letter. 
3.2 Graphical evidence
Pension awareness is measured by combining two sets of information from the 
survey. First, we measure pension literacy based on five questions regarding the 
current pension system. If people read the letter and remember the content, they 
should be able to answer the questions correctly. Details on these five questions are 
presented in Table C1 of the Appendix. We also asked people how confident they were 
about their answer (on a scale from 1 to 5). Table C1 shows that the percentage of 
respondents who gave the right answer to a question ranges from 28 to 82 percent. 
Respondents who gave a correct answer were more confident about giving the correct 
answer. Second, we measure whether people obtained insight into their own pension 
situation, based on whether the respondent logged in on the national pension 
website.
18 With 95% confidence level this sample does not deviate more than 4.2% of the actual compo-
sition of the population with respect to age, gender, household composition, labor market 
participation, and education. We thus conclude that the sample is representative for the Dutch 
population at least with regard to these observed variables.
19 Specifically we asked: “Do you remember an advertisement asking to log in on mijnpensioen-
overzicht.nl in the past six weeks?”. Respondents received several false options such as 
through radio/tv and newspaper and the true option through Facebook. Our sample consists of 
45 respondents who confirmed remembering the advertisement through Facebook.
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 To get a first impression of the effect on pension awareness of the letters that 
arouse curiosity and fear, we present in Figure 3a the average number of correct 
answers to the pension literacy questions (bars) and the 95% confidence intervals 
(lines). This figure shows that, on average, not more than two out of five questions 
are answered correctly in the three different groups that received a curiosity-framed 
letter, a fear-framed letter, or no letter. With an average of about 2.1 correct answers, 
the group without a letter performs poorest. The group that received a curiosity- 
framed letter performs slightly better. The group that received a letter appealing to 
fear gives the most correct answers (about 2.2). The difference between receiving 
a letter appealing to fear and receiving no letter is statistically significant, with a 
p-value of 0.01. The pension literacy of those receiving a curiosity-framed letter is 
not significantly different from those receiving no letter (p-value=0.54), and weakly 
significantly different from those receiving a letter appealing to fear (p-value=0.07).  
 Similarly, Figure 3b shows the pension check by the type of letter received or 
receiving no letter. Thirty percent of the respondents without a letter logged in on 
their pension overview. For the respondents with a curiosity-framed letter this is 
somewhat more, namely 32%. Those with a letter appealing to fear logged in most 
(33%), although the differences are modest and not statistically significant (p-values 
are 0.30, 0.12, and 0.66, respectively). 
 Next to the letters, we used the Facebook ad to raise pension awareness. As the 
Facebook ad only included information with regard to three questions (1, 4, and 5), 
the pension literacy scale for the Facebook ad runs from 0 to 3. Figure 4a shows that 
only 0.8 out of 3 questions were answered correctly by persons that did not see the 
ad. Persons who saw the ad answered 0.93 out of 3 questions correctly. The difference 
is not statistically significant (p-value=0.28). 
 Figure 4b shows the percentage of respondents doing the pension check, broken 
down by viewing the ad (note that this does not represent a causal effect, since see-
ing the ad may not be random). In the group that did not see the ad, only about 15% 
of the people logged in. In the group that saw the ad this percentage is much higher 
(54%). Even though the number of respondents who saw the ad is low, the difference 
is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.00. Section 4 tests the aforementioned 
causal relationships in detail by estimating the models. 
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Figure 3a. Pension literacy. 
Number of correct answers (0-5) to pension knowledge questions by type of letter.
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Figure 3b. Pension check. 
Fraction logged in by type of letter.
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Figure 4a. Pension literacy. 
Number of correct answers (0-3) to pension knowledge questions by viewers of 
Facebook ad.
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Figure 4b. Pension check. F
raction logged in by viewers of Facebook ad.
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4. Estimation results
4.1 Letters
Model 1 in Table 3 shows that receiving a letter increases the number of correct 
answers significantly by 0.06. Model 2 suggests that this effect is primarily due to 
receiving a letter that arouses fear: receiving such a letter significantly increases the 
number of correct answers by 0.11. This result is in line with the psychological litera-
ture, which finds that negative information tends to influence decisions more strongly 
than positive information (Ito et al., 1998). In practice, this means that, after sending 
the letter arousing fear to a group of people, on average 1 out of 10 persons give an 
additional correct answer to the pension questions (compared to the situation of not 
receiving the letter).20 This is a remarkable result as the questions are asked six weeks 
after the receipt of the letter. A curiosity-framed letter does not significantly increase 
pension literacy.21 After conditioning on gender, education, household composition, 
work, and age, the treatment effects remain virtually the same (as expected because 
of the random assignment of the letters).22 
20 In Table C3 in the Appendix we do the same analysis for the five pension literacy questions 
separately. This shows us that the increase in pension literacy as a result of the letter with fear 
appeal is primarily because of better scores on question 1 and 4 (for details, see Table C1 in the 
Appendix). This demonstrates that the increase in pension literacy is due to better scores on 
both a relatively simple and a more advanced question about the pension system. 
21 Testing H0: β2 + δ1 = 0 in Model 4 gives a p-value of 0.55.
22 We evaluated the questions and answers with pension experts from Netspar. Some mentioned 
that the correct answer of the question “What is roughly the percentage of earnings that is on 
average used to pay pension contributions (by all parties)” depends on the interpretation of 
the question. People pay a premium of about 20% of their pensionable salary, which is only 
part of their full salary because of a state pension offset. This could result in 10, 15 and 20% 
being correct answers. We did robustness checks of the estimation results when marking 10 
and/or 15% also as correct. Conclusions are highly robust. 
Table 3. Effects of randomized letters on pension awareness
Pension literacy (0-5) Pension check (0,1)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OLS OLS Probit Probit
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. AME S.E. AME S.E.
Letter 0.06** 0.03 0.11*** 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02a
Curiosity letter -0.08* 0.05 -0.01 0.02
Constant 2.11*** 0.02 2.11*** 0.02 0.32*** 0.01 0.32*** 0.01
Observations 4,212   4,212   4,124   4,124  
Robust standard errors are presented, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level,  
and *** at 1% level. AMEs are the average marginal effects. a p-value of 0.12.
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Table 4. Heterogeneous effects of randomized letters
Dependent variable: Pension literacy (0-5)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OLS OLS OLS
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Letter (β2) 0.13** 0.06 0.13** 0.05 0.07 0.05
Letter · Age 20-40 (β2
age) 0.06 0.08
Letter · Female (β2
fem) -0.08 0.08
Letter · High edu. (β2
edu) 0.08 0.08
Curiosity letter (δ1) -0.12* 0.06 -0.14** 0.06 -0.06 0.06
Curiosity letter · Age 20-40 (δ1
age) 0.07 0.09
Curiosity letter · Female (δ1
fem) 0.13 0.09
Curiosity letter · High edu. (δ1
edu) -0.04 0.10
Observations 4,212 4,124 4,212
Dependent variable: Pension check (0,1)
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Probit Probit Probit
  AME S.E. AME S.E. AME S.E.
Letter (β2) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
Letter · Age 20-40 (β2
age) 0.02 0.03
Letter · Female (β2
fem) -0.01 0.04
Letter · High edu. (β2
edu) 0.04 0.04
Curiosity letter (δ1) -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03
Curiosity letter · Age 20-40 (δ1
age) 0.02 0.04
Curiosity letter · Female (δ1
fem) 0.00 0.04
Curiosity letter · High edu. (δ1
edu) -0.01 0.04
Observations 4,124 4,124 4,124
Robust standard errors are presented, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level,  
and *** at 1% level. AMEs are the average marginal effects. The models include variables for 
gender, education, household composition, work, and age. Extended estimation results can 
be found in appendix C.
a H0: β2+β2age=0 gives p-value=0.21 (Model 1) and p-value=0.12 (Model 4).
b  H0: δ1+δ1age=0 gives p-value=0.52 (Model 1) and p-value=0.88 (Model 4).
c H0: β2+β2age+ δ1+δ1age =0 gives p-value=0.61 (Model 1) and p-value=0.08 (Model 4).
d H0: β2+β2fem=0 gives p-value=0.35 (Model 2) and p-value=0.38 (Model 5).
e H0: δ1+δ1fem=0 gives p-value=0.94 (Model 2) and p-value=0.80 (Model 5).
f H0: β2+β2fem+ δ1+δ1fem =0 gives p-value=0.35 (Model 2) and p-value=0.53 (Model 5).
g H0: β2+β2edu=0 gives p-value=0.03 (Model 3) and p-value=0.06 (Model 6).
h H0: δ1+δ1edu=0 gives p-value=0.20 (Model 3) and p-value=0.70 (Model 6).
i H0: β2+β2edu+ δ1+δ1edu =0 gives p-value=0.48 (Model 3) and p-value=0.15 (Model 6).
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 Models 3 and 4 show the average marginal effects of the probit models. From 
Model 4 we conclude that receiving a letter that arouses fear increases the probability 
of doing the pension check by 3 percentage points. However, this effect is not signif-
icant at the 10% significance level (the p-value is 0.12). Also, the effect of a curiosi-
ty-framed letter is not significantly different from zero.23 To ensure that the Facebook 
ad does not interfere with our estimated results for the informative letters, we present 
some robustness checks in Table D1. In the robustness checks, we estimate the base-
line regression on the sample of persons aged 41-64 years who were not targeted with 
the Facebook ad. However, theoretically they still might have seen the ad because of 
their network liking the ad. Therefore, we also present estimation results for those 
people who do not use Facebook. The results are robust to our conclusions from the 
baseline regression. Interestingly, among the respondents who do not use Facebook, 
we find a much stronger effect of the letter arousing fear on pension literacy than 
for the total sample. On average almost three out of ten non-Facebook users give an 
additional correct answer to the pension question (compared to the situation without 
a letter). 
 Heterogeneous effects of the letters with regard to age, gender, and education 
level are analyzed in Table 4. The effect of the letter on pension literacy is not sig-
nificantly different for people in the 20-40 and 41-64 age groups (Model 1). This also 
applies for the pension check (Model 4). For the 20-40 age group, however, we do 
find that a curiosity-framed letter increases the pension check by 4 percentage points 
(Model 4, table note c). We do not find heterogeneous effects for gender and edu-
cation levels. We do find that the letter arousing fear significantly increases pension 
checks of highly educated individuals by 5 percentage points (Model 6, table note g). 
4.2 Facebook ad
Table 5 shows the estimation results of the quasi-experiment with the Facebook ad 
(equations (3) and (4)). As the Facebook ad was targeted at people between the ages 
of 20 and 40, we restrict the sample to individuals in the same age category. 
 A simple OLS estimate (Model 1) shows no significant effect of the Facebook ad on 
pension literacy.24  However, these coefficients might be biased due to non-random-
23 Testing H0: β2 + δ1 = 0 in Model 8 gives a p-value of 0.18.
24 Note that the pension literacy indicator runs from 0 to 3 here, because the information pro-
vided in the Facebook ad only provides the reader with the information for answering three of 
the five questions (for details see Section 3). Table C2 in the Appendix uses the same set of 
questions for the analysis of the letters. Conclusions are highly comparable using three or five 
pension literacy questions. 
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ness in the probability of seeing the Facebook ad. Therefore, Model 2 shows estimates 
of the IV model using an instrumental variable indicating someone to be a Facebook 
user.25 The instrument (dummy of Facebook use) significantly explains the probability 
of having seen the Facebook ad. The probability of having seen the ad increases by 
2 percentage points if one uses Facebook. The F-statistic (36.4) for excluding this 
instrument shows that the instrument is highly relevant in explaining the visibility 
of the Facebook ad (its value is greater than the rule of thumb of 10). Correcting for 
potential endogeneity changes the coefficient of the Facebook ad (from 0.13 to -2.16) 
although both are insignificant.26 Note again that the Facebook ad was targeted at all 
people between the ages of 20 and 40. Seeing the ad was independent of people’s 
preferences or behavior on Facebook. 
 From Model 3 we conclude that those who saw the Facebook ad did the pension 
check more often. We find an increase of about 27 percentage points. In Model 4 we 
exploit the instrument (Facebook use) in a linear 2SLS framework. The results show an 
insignificant but unreasonably high effect of the Facebook ad on the pension check. 
The coefficient is 1.21, such that predictions are no longer between 0 and 1. In Model 
5 we explicitly take into account the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables. 
Using a bivariate probit model we find an effect of 72 percentage points.27 Comparable 
to Model (2), the instrument (being a Facebook user) significantly increases the proba-
bility of having seen the Facebook ad. This probability increases by about 2 percentage 
points for Facebook users and is highly significant. The results are very robust for 
different specifications of Facebook usage as an instrument. That is, when we use 
time spent on Facebook in hours per week, we find an effect of 71 percentage points. 
When we use a semi-parametric approach for Facebook use, using dummies for the 
percentiles of time spent on Facebook as instruments,28 we also find an effect of 71 
percentage points.  
25 Estimation results are highly robust to using the total time spent on Facebook in hours per 
week as an instrumental variable.
26 Adding an interaction effect between the letter and having seen the Facebook ad shows a 
coefficient that is not significant and does not change the main conclusions (not reported 
here). 
27 Adding an interaction effect between the letter and having seen the Facebook ad shows a 
coefficient that is negative and significant (at the 1% level). If a person received a letter and 
was aware of the Facebook ad, there is a 62.6% probability of logging in. 
28 1st percentile: 0, 2nd percentile: 0-0.17, 3rd percentile: 0.17-1, 4th percentile: 1-1.02, 5th per-
centile: 1.02-2, 6th percentile: 2-2.5, 7th percentile: 2.5-4, 8th percentile: 4-6, 9th percentile: 
6-10, 10th percentile: 10+.
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Table 5. Effects of Facebook ad on pension awareness
 Dependent variable: Pension literacy (0-3)
Model 1 Model 2
OLS 2SLS
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Second stage
Facebook ad 0.13 0.12 -2.16 2.29
Letter 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
Curiosity letter -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.05
Female -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.05
Low edu. level 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.06
High edu. level 0.07* 0.04 0.07 0.04
Single household 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.05
Children 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.05
Full-time work 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05
Age 25-29 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06
Age 30-34 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.09
Age 35-40 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.07
Constant 0.70*** 0.05 0.80*** 0.09
First stage
FB user 0.02*** 0.00
Control variables yes
F-stat. instrument 36.2
Observations 2,128 2,128
Dependent variable: Pension check (0,1) 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Probit 2SLS Biv. Probit
  AME S.E. AME S.E. AME S.E.
Second stage
Facebook ad 0.27*** 0.07 1.21 1.24 0.72*** 0.01
Letter 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Curiosity letter 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03
Female -0.09*** 0.02 -0.08*** 0.03 -0.07*** 0.02
Low edu. level 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
High edu. level 0.07*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02
Single household -0.06** 0.03 -0.05** 0.03 -0.06** 0.02
Children -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02
Full-time work -0.04** 0.02 -0.05** 0.03 -0.04** 0.02
Age 25-29 0.11*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.03
Age 30-34 0.13*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.04 0.13*** 0.03
Age 35-40 0.10*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.04 0.10*** 0.03
Constant 0.28*** 0.01 0.19*** 0.05 0.29*** 0.01
First stage
FB user 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00
Control variables yes yes
F-stat. instrument 36.0
Observations 2,067 2,067 2,067
Robust standard errors are presented, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level,  
and *** at 1% level. AMEs represent Average Marginal Effects. For example, an AME of 0.27 indicates 
that the pension check is increased with 27 percentage points. In the first stage, Facebook use 
(1: Yes – 0: No) is expressed in percentage-point increases in the probability of seeing the 
Facebook ad. Thus, 0.02 indicates that a Facebook user increases the probability of having seen 
the ad by 2 percentage points. The reported statistic for the instrument in the first stage of the 
probit model presents the value of the Chi-square test. 
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 Summarizing our empirical evidence, we find that the Facebook ad was very 
strong in activating respondents to do their pension check. The coefficient for pension 
literacy is not significant.  Sending an informative letter leads to higher occurrence of 
the pension check among highly educated individuals and raises pension literacy for 
all groups. However, this is only true if the informative letter arouses fear. Letters that 
attempt to arouse curiosity did not have an effect on pension awareness. 
4.3 Cost-effectiveness
As explained in Section 2.2 (Figure 2), for the letters we measure the intention to treat, 
while for Facebook we measure the effect of the ad conditional on having seen the ad 
(so, we find the effect for those complying with the treatment). Therefore, it is difficult 
to compare the estimated effects in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Furthermore, the cost of 
sending a letter versus publishing a Facebook ad is very different. Hence, this section 
provides a back-of-the-envelope calculation to compare the cost-effectiveness of the 
letter with fear appeal versus the Facebook ad. 
 Our results suggest that the letter with fear appeal has a significant effect on 
pension awareness. 1,051 persons received a letter with fear appeal (see Table 1). The 
cost of sending these letters was €504.48. The letters that arouse fear increased the 
number of correctly answered questions by 0.11 (on a scale of 0 to 5). In total, 116 
additional questions were answered correctly because of the letter (0.11*1,051). So, 
€4.35 (504.48/116) was spent for each additional correct answer. 
 We do not find a significant effect of the letter on the probability of logging in; 
however, the point estimate is 0.03 (p-value of 0.12). When we take the point esti-
mate, the letters that arouse fear increased the number of logins by 32 (1,051*0.03). 
Thus €15.77 was spent for each additional person that logged in (504.48/32). Table 6 
summarizes the cost benefit analysis for the letter with fear appeal.
 The Facebook ad was targeted at individuals between 20 and 40 years. The Dutch 
population includes 4,206,639 individuals between 20 and 40 years. 87% of the 
Table 6. Cost benefit analysis of letter with fear appeal
a Number of persons who received a letter with fear appeal 1,051
b Cost of sending the letters with fear appeal €504.48
c Marginal effect of the letter on the number of correct answers 0.11
d Number of correct answers because of the letter with fear appeal (a*c) 116
e Cost per additional correct answer (b/d) €4.35
f Average marginal effect of the letter on pension checking 0.03
g Additional number of logins because of the letters with fear appeal (a*f) 32
h Cost per additional login (b/g) €15.77
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respondents in this age category report a positive number of hours spent on Facebook 
per week.29 We therefore expect about 3,678,633 individuals in the Netherlands 
between 20 and 40 years to use Facebook actively (0.87*4,206,639). Facebook statis-
tics indicate that we reached 770,134 individuals aged 20 to 40. This means that we 
reached 21% of the active Facebook users (770,134/3,678,633).  Our sample contains 
1,902 active Facebook users between 20 and 40 years. So, when we assume a reach of 
21%, about 398 individuals in our sample were reached (21% of 1,902). Eleven percent 
of these (45/398) complied with the treatment (they reported having seen the ad). For 
them, we find a 71 percentage point higher probability of logging in and answering 
0.52 additional questions correctly (on a scale of 0 to 3). In total this means about 32 
(0.72*45) additional persons logging in and 23 (0.52*45) additional correct answers.
€1,939.76 was spent on the Facebook ad to reach the Dutch active Facebook users 
between the ages of 20 and 40. Proportionally on our sample, 1 euro was spent 
(€1,939.76*(1,902/3,678,633)). This means that for each additional correct answer 4.3 
cents were spent (1/23), and for each additional person logging in 3.1 cents were spent 
(1/32). Table 7 summarizes the cost benefit analysis for the Facebook ad.
 Comparing Tables 6 and 7, we find that the effect of the intention to treat on the 
number of correct answers is 0.11 for the letter with fear appeal and 0.06 for the 
Facebook ad (i/f in Table 7). The letter is thus almost twice as effective in increasing 
29 This is very similar to the number found by Newcom Research in its Dutch Social Media Report, 
namely that 89% of the population between the ages of 20 and 39 uses Facebook. 
https://www.marketingfacts.nl/berichten/jongeren-keren-facebook-massaal-de-rug-toe
Table 7. Cost benefit analysis of the Facebook ad
a Number of people between the ages of 20 and 40 in the Netherlands 4,206,639
b Share of Facebook users in the 20-40 age group 87%
c Number of people reached with the FB ad 770,134
d Share of FB users reached with the FB ad (c/a*b) 21%
e Number of FB users in our sample 1,902
f Estimate of number of FB users who were reached in our sample (d*e) 398
g Number of respondents who remembered having seen the ad 45 (=11%)
h Marginal effect of the FB ad on the number of correct answers 0.52
i Number of correct answers because of the FB ad (g*h) 23
j Cost of publishing the FB ad, targeting all people between 20-40 years €1,939.76
k Cost of the FB ad relative to our sample (j*(e/a*b)) €1.00
l Cost per additional correct answer (k/i)       €0.043 
m Average marginal effect of the FB ad on pension check 0.72
n Additional number of logins because of the FB ad (g*m) 32
o Cost per additional login (k/n)       €0.031
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financial literacy compared to the Facebook ad. However, since the Facebook ad is 
much cheaper than sending a letter, the Facebook ad is much more cost-effective.
The effect of the intention to treat on the pension check is 0.03 for the letter with fear 
appeal and 0.08 for the Facebook ad (n/f in Table 7). The Facebook ad is thus almost 
three times more effective in increasing the pension check than the letter with fear 
appeal. This may be caused by the fact that Facebook users only need to click on 
the link, whereas readers of the letter must first grab their smart phone, tablet or 
computer to surf to the website. Since the Facebook ad is more effective and cheaper 
than the letter with fear appeal, the cost-effectiveness is higher for the Facebook ad. 
Note that the costs of the Facebook ad are very low compared to the letter. This makes 
Facebook a very useful communication channel when one wants to target a group of 
people with information.     
4.4 Insight, confidence, interest, power to act and worries
The focus of this paper is on pension awareness, which we define as a combination of 
pension literacy and doing the pension check. Ultimately, however, we want people 
not just to log in to see their pension entitlements, but also to have more insight 
and confidence after the login, so that they know what to do (power to act) and in 
the end become more interested in their pension.30 To gain some insight into this, 
we present some statements to the respondents who did the pension check. Table 
8 shows the results. Assuming that categories 4 and 5 reflect positive effects, insight 
increased for over 57%31 of the respondents and confidence for 34%.32 Fifty percent33 
of the respondents feel that they know better what to do, and 43%34 have become 
more interested in their pension. 
 Our results show that fear appeal is more effective in increasing pension awareness 
than arousing curiosity. However, one may be concerned that fear appeal will backfire 
and cause people to have greater worries about their pension. In the end, we do not 
want to make people anxious. In Figure 5 we compare worries about pensions, among 
those who got a fear-framed letter, a curiosity-framed letter, or no letter. People are 
asked to report their worries on a 5-point scale, from completely no worries (1) to lots 
of worries (5). Figure 5 shows that the levels of worry are very similar between the two 
30 Using a natural experiment, Mastrobuoni (2011) showed that more knowledge does not always 
lead to a change in behavior. 
31 37.15+20.32=57.47
32 23.70+10.33=34.03
33 35.35+15.12=50.47
34 29.38+14.06=43.44
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types of letter, which is confirmed by statistical tests showing that the average level 
of worrying does not differ between a curiosity-framed letter or fear-appealing letter 
compared to receiving no letter (p-value = 0.49 and p-value = 0.67, respectively). 
Neither does the average level of worrying differ between receiving a curiosity-framed 
letter and a fear-appealing letter (p-value = 0.83).
Figure 5. Worries about pensions (1: none – 5: lots) by letter and type of letter (in %).
Table 8. Consequences of the pension check
Did logging in increase... (1-5) 1 (not 
at all)
2 3 4 5 (fully 
agree)
Obs.
Insight in personal pension situation? 5.22% 7.98% 29.33% 37.15% 20.32% 1,265
Confidence in personal pension situation? 8.73% 21.46% 35.79% 23.70% 10.33% 1,249
Interest in personal pension situation? 5.97% 14.85% 35.74% 29.38% 14.06% 1,273
Actions that can be taken with the 
information?
5.20% 12.99% 34.34% 35.35% 15.12% 1,270
Awareness of having insufficient accrued 
pension rights?
24.49% 22.04% 23.46% 17.85% 12.16% 1,266
Descriptive statistics of respondents who did the pension check, regardless of treatments.
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5. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of different communication channels and of 
framing on raising pension awareness. More specifically, we analyze the effectiveness 
of an informative letter versus a Facebook ad, and the effectiveness of arousing 
curiosity and fear to raise pension awareness. Pension awareness is measured by 1) 
knowledge of the Dutch pension system, and 2) actions undertaken to gain informa-
tion regarding one’s personal financial situation. Both are important for governments, 
private pension funds and insurance companies, as pension reforms are high on the 
policy agenda of many countries. As far as we know, we are the first to investigate the 
effect of framing on pension awareness six weeks after the information is presented. 
 To identify the causal effect of a letter, we rely on a randomized field experiment 
involving a survey administered to a representative sample of about 4,000 indi-
viduals in the Netherlands. Randomization takes place in 1) receiving a letter with 
information regarding the pension system as well as detailed information on where 
to find information about one’s personal situation, and 2) the type of framing of the 
letter (arousing curiosity or fear). To identify the causal effects of a Facebook ad with 
a selection of the same content, we use an Instrumental Variables approach that uses 
self-reported time spent on Facebook as an instrument. This instrument appears to 
be promising (also for other researchers) to investigate the effect of a Facebook ad on 
diverse outcome variables. This approach bypasses ethical issues that experiments on 
social media platforms may involve. 
 The results show that pension literacy is low. The Facebook ad is very strong in 
activating respondents to log in on the webpage of mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl to see 
their personal financial situation, and it is relatively cheap (3.1 eurocents per login). 
An informative letter with fear appeal is less effective in stimulating active logging 
in on a website but more effective in raising ‘long-term’ pension literacy. Letters, 
however, are also more expensive, such that the Facebook ad wins when it comes to 
cost-effectiveness. Curiosity-framed letters did not raise pension awareness signifi-
cantly. Finally, we do not find significantly heterogeneous effects with regard to age, 
gender, and education level. 
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6. Discussion
Although estimation results are highly robust to different specifications and estima-
tors, we should remain aware of the possible drawbacks of our approach in this paper 
and take these into account when interpreting the results. In this paper, pension 
awareness consists of two elements. The first is objectively measured by several 
questions regarding the pension system. The second, however, is not whether people 
have taken action to log in but whether they say that they have taken the action. 
There might be a difference between what people do and what they say they do. We 
assume in this paper that there is no difference, or at least that the differences are 
random across the control and treatment groups, but future research might focus on 
revealed instead of stated actions, by merging administrative data about logins. 
 A second point of discussion is the small percentage of respondents that men-
tioned being aware of the Facebook ad. Since only 45 out of the 2,166 targeted 
respondents remember seeing the Facebook ad, identification of the effect of the 
Facebook ad relies on a small sample of respondents. Another issue is the representa-
tiveness of the panel. PanelWizard stratifies the sample of survey respondents in such 
a way that the panel is representative of the Dutch population with regard to age, 
gender, education level, and labor market status. However, it should be kept in mind 
that the panel only consists of internet users. This may lead to overestimation of the 
effect of the Facebook ad. However, in the group aged 20-40 years, for whom we test 
the Facebook ad, internet coverage is very high in the Netherlands (12-24 years: 98.7% 
/ 25-44 years: 98.2%)35. It should, therefore, be safe to draw conclusions from our 
estimation results. 
 This study shows that fear appeal is effective in attracting people’s attention to 
pensions (and we do not leave them with more worries). In addition, a Facebook ad 
is effective when it comes to activating people to log in on a website for their pension 
information. One could of course combine these results, using a Facebook ad that 
arouses fear to stimulate people to do a pension check.  
35 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2016/22/acht-procent-van-de-nederlanders-nooit-op-
internet 
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Appendix A Letters that attempt to arouse curiosity and fear
Below we attach the letters that were sent. To explain the content of the letters, we 
highlighted some text in green, yellow, or red (we did not do so in the real letters). 
The text that we highlighted in green attempts to arouse curiosity; the text in red 
attempts to arouse fear; the blue boxes (in both letters) show a roadmap to do the 
pension check; the yellow text (in both letters) contains basic information about the 
Dutch pension system. 
Curiosity (green) translation:
“What can you do? 
Imagine: After years of hard work, the moment has arrived. You can retire. All of a 
sudden there is plenty of time for that trip around the world, the hobby you never 
had time for, or growing geraniums. No matter what, all this costs money. Maybe 
more than the benefits you receive from your state and occupational pensions. 
Are you curious about how much you have saved already? And what you can do with 
these savings in retirement? Have a look at the website mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl 
(“my pension overview”) after you have completed your yearly tax return, because 
then you already have your DigiD (your digital government ID) at hand to log in! This is 
how it works:”
Fear (red) translation: 
“Are you worried?
Gloomy messages reach us in the media about the pension system. “We will be 
unable to keep funding the state pension”, “Pension funds prepare participants for 
lower pensions”, “Government warns about lower pensions.” It is not surprising that 
eight out of ten people are insecure about their retirement income or think that they 
do not build up enough pension.
Have you taken care of your pension? Do you want to know whether you have 
sufficient pension money to get by during retirement? Have a look at the website 
mijnpensioenoverzicht.nl (“my pension overview”) after you have completed your 
yearly tax return, because then you already have your DigiD (your digital government 
ID) at hand to log in! This is how it works:”
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Appendix C Pension literacy questions
Table C1. Pension literacy questions and answers
% Confidence (1-5)
Q1 “What happens with state pension contributions?”
a) Invested for my pension benefits after retirement 12.18 2.77
b) Used to pay pensions for current retirees 37.94 3.39
c) Partly invested and partly used to pay pensions for current 
retirees
49.88 3.10
Q2 “Who pays contributions to employer-related pensions?”
a) Usually employees only 9.72 2.70
b) Usually employers only 8.56 2.86
c) Usually both employees and employers 81.73 3.63
Q3 “When the financial condition of a pension fund is poor, the 
pension fund needs to cut pensions. Which pension fund 
participants are hit by a pension cut?”
a) Retirees 32.87 3.32
b) Active employees 20.42 2.86
c) All employees (both past and active) and retirees 46.70 3.34
Q4 “What is roughly the average percentage of earnings that is 
used to pay pension contributions (by all parties combined)?
a) 10% 34.03 2.43
b) 15% 39.23 2.36
c) 20% 20.00 2.57
d) 30% 6.74 2.67
Q5 “Anne and Jane are colleagues with the same hourly wage and 
pension plan. Anne works 20 hours per week and Jane 40 hours 
per week. How high is Anne’s employment-related pension?”
a) Half of Jane’s pension. 27.66 2.81
b) Less than half of Jane’s pension. 13.84 2.83
c) Depends on the pension plan. 58.50 2.87
Table C2. Pension literacy with Facebook information only.
Dependent variable: Pension literacy (0-3)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OLS OLS OLS OLS
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Letter 0.05* 0.02 0.07** 0.03 0.05* 0.02 0.07** 0.03
Curiosity letter -0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.04
Control variables included No No Yes Yes
Observations 4,212 4,212 4,212 4,212
Robust standard errors are presented, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level,  
and *** at 1% level. 
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Table C3. Pension literacy questions separately as dependent variables.
Dependent variable: Pension literacy questions 1 to 5
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Letter 0.03* 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04** 0.02 0.00 0.02
Curiosity letter -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Observations 4,220 4,219 4,216 4,214 4,212
Robust standard errors are presented, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level,  
and *** at 1% level.
Appendix D Excluding Facebook in effects of letters
Table D1. Effect of letters on pension awareness, for the 41-65 age group and for the 
sample of non-Facebook users.
Pension literacy (0-5) Pension check (0,1)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Age 41-65 No FB Age 41-65 No FB
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. AME S.E. AME S.E.
Letter 0.14** 0.06 0.27*** 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.04
Curiosity letter -0.12* 0.07 -0.08 0.11 -0.04 0.03 -0.08 0.05
Constant 2.22*** 0.03 2.18*** 0.06 0.35*** 0.01 0.31*** 0.02
Observations 2,084   721   2,057   711  
Robust standard errors are presented, * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level  
and *** at 1% level. AMEs are the average marginal effects.
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